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Land Acknowledgement

“I acknowledge Indigenous people as the traditional stewards of the land and the
enduring relationship that exists between them and their traditional territories. The
land on which I sit is the traditional unceded territory of the Wampanoag nation
and I acknowledge their painful history of genocide and forced occupation of their
territory, I will work to educate myself and others and to speak out against
injustice. I honor and respect the many diverse Indigenous people connected to this
land on which I live from time immemorial.”
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‘Restoring Balance’ - Reconstructing Indigenous Strategies in King Philip’s War

Chapter 1 - Introduction

King Philip’s War (1675 – 1678) was one of several "Indian Wars" in 17th-century colonial
America. It was also referred to as “the first Indian war." However, there had been a previous
conflict known as The Pequot War (1636 – 1638). Unlike the previous war and unrelated
skirmishes over the years, King Philip’s War was a regional conflict that quickly spread
throughout coastal and interior Native homelands in what is now called New England. While
issues that caused the war built up over decades, the war formally began on the 25th of June,1
1675, when a band of Pauquunaukit Wampanoag (anglicized as Pokanoket, literally, "land at the
clearing")2 attacked several isolated homesteads in the small Plymouth colony settlement of
Swansea.3 Their leader, or Sachem, was a man named Metacom, known as Philip to the English.4
Metacom was the son of 8sâmeeqan (Ousamequin), more commonly known as Massasoit.5 He
1

The 25th of June is the date most commonly cited and agreed upon by most scholars of King Philip’s War.
However, there is some debate over the date, based on a raid on one of Josiah Winslow’s homes which supposedly
occurred on the 20th of June, and apparent miscommunication between colonial settlements at the outbreak of the
war.
2
The Council of Seven Royal House, Pokanoket Tribe, Pokanoket Nation, https://pokanokettribe.com/ throughout
this paper, every attempt will be made to acknowledge and refer to the various Native American peoples involved
using names and terminologies they use to identify themselves and their ancestral lands.
3
Increase Mather, A Brief History of the Warr With the Indians in New England, 1676, An Online Electronic Text
Edition, ed. Paul Royster, Faculty Publications, UNL Libraries. 31. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/31
The reason for this particular citation is to establish the date of the attack on Swansea. This is the most often referred
to date, but other histories, primarily from secondary sources, give other dates as late as the 29 th of June 1675.
4
He took the name Philip to honor the relations between the colonists and his father and even purchased Europeanstyle apparel in Boston. Billy J Stratton, Buried in Shades of Night: Contested Voices, Indian Captives, and the
Legacy of King Philip’s War, (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 2013)
5

The name Massasoit is an Abenaki term that most closely translates to "Great Sachem" Until recent decades, he
was almost universally referred to by his title as opposed to his actual name. The transliteration of the name as
8sâmeeqan here is based upon the remarkable work of the Wôpanâak Language Reclamation Project, which began
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was the same Massasoit who assisted the first English settlers at Plymouth in 1620. While the
war ended in Southern New England with Philip's death on the 12th of August, 1676, the war
continued in Northern New England until the Treaty of Casco in April of 1678. King Philip’s
War was therefore not a localized event like the earlier Pequot War (1636 – 1638). The Pequot
War served as an example of what the Indigenous nations faced at the hand of the English. In
that war, the English made no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, as evidenced
by the Connecticut and Massachusetts Colonies' attack on the Pequot fortified village at Mystic
on the 26th of May, 1637.6 The Pequot defeat may well have provided food for thought among
Indigenous nations in the area, and may have catalyzed their commitment towards procuring
firearms. 7
Much has already been written about King Philip’s War. Until the 1990s, histories of the war
focused on battles and their outcomes, derived primarily from primary sources and documents
that were almost singularly English in origin; as such, they all tended to follow similar plot lines
and were at times blatantly racist.8 In 1998, Jill Lepore published The Name of War; in this book,

in 1992 as a joint collaborative effort of the Mashpee, Aquinnah, Assonet & Herring Pond Wampanoag
communities to bring back the Wampanoag ancestral language after 150 years of dormancy (Home | Wôpanâak
Language Reclamation Project (wlrp.org).
6
On the 26th of May, 1637, a force of approximately 90 English and 100 Native allies (Narragansett, Mohegan,
Niantic, and Connecticut River Indians) attacked and burned the fortified Pequot village of Mistick Fort, killing over
400 adults and children. Here we see how a name can influence our perceptions. The English referred to this event
as a battle. Descendants of the Pequot and descendants of the Narragansett, Mohegan, Niantic, and Connecticut
River Indians refer to it much more correctly as a massacre. *Battlefields of the Pequot War, Mashantucket Pequot
Museum and Research Center, American Battlefield Protection Program,
http://pequotwar.org/archaeology/overviewbattle-of-mistic-fort/
7
Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675 – 1815, (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1998), p. 68. It is also entirely possible, as pointed out by Dr. Kevin McBride, that the primary catalyst was
the regional inter-tribal conflicts that followed the Pequot War, perhaps as a result of the political/military void left
by the defeat of the Pequot. However, it is also possible that Native communities also began to acquire firearms in
anticipation of the conflict with the English they were sure was coming.
8
Whether rooted in cultural biases, racial biases, or both, the attitudes towards indigenous people are plain to see in
the primary sources. For example, in Cotton Mather's work Magnalia Christi Americana, Mather used terms that
were common at the time: “The time-limited by Heaven for the Succe'ls of the Indian Treacheries was now almoft
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Lepore looked not just at battle histories but at geographic, political, cultural, and racial aspects
of the war and how it contributed to the American Identity. Her work marked the beginning of
historiographic writing that took a deeper look at the war's ethnography. This has been expanded
on most recently by the writings of James Drake (2000), Lisa Brooks (2018), and Christine
DeLucia (2018). Authors such as Douglas Edward Leach (1958) and Patrick Malone (1999) have
also examined how Indigenous nations fought during the war. Guided by their writings and
revisiting primary sources, a clearer picture can be drawn regarding how Indigenous nations used
diplomacy, developed alliances, and acquitted themselves far better than the way in which earlier
historiography portrayed them. The New England commander Benjamin Church wanted his
army to be, at the very least, twenty-five percent Indigenous.9 Regarding Indigenous use of
European firearms, Connecticut Deputy Governor William Leete stated that they were "so
accurate marks men above our men, to doe execution, whereby more of ours are like to fall,
rather than of theirs, unless the Lord by special providence, do deliver them into our hands.” 10
Another resource for the study of the war is the archaeological record. Archaeology can tell
us many things the written records do not. It can verify or even change the accepted views of
what took place, where it took place, and when. The archaeological work that has been done has
helped to both verify and bring a more precise picture to the written accounts of the Battle of
Great Falls / Wissantinnewag – Peskeompskut (the 19th of May, 1676) and the Second Battle of
Nipsachuck (Battle of Mattity Swamp), the latter of which occurred on the 2nd of July, 1676.

expired: The Blafphemy, and Infolence, and prodigious Barbarity of the Salvages…” Book VII, p. 52,
https://archives.org/details/magnaliachristia00math
9

Benjamin Church, The History of the Eastern Expeditions, ed. Henry Martyn Dexter (Boston, 1867) p. 133.
https://archive.org/details/historyofeastern00chur_0
10
William Leete, as quoted by Armstrong Starkey in European and Native American Warfare 1675 – 1815,
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), p. 68.
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Current research at the Battle of Great Falls (Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut) involves tracing
the English retreat after their massacre of a nearby Native American village. Using metal
detectors, GPS, and GIS software, researchers have been able to locate musket balls, horse tack,
and other artifacts from the battle, and reconstruct many aspects of the battle, including the likely
routes the English took in their retreat. Collections of dropped, faceted, and impacted musket
balls of varying calibers were the result of the various skirmishes and ambushes along a route
that followed Cherry Rum Brook to the Greene and Deerfield Rivers. The historical narrative of
the Battle of Great Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut came primarily from three sources:
William Hubbard’s Narrative of the Indian Wars, Increase Mather’s A Brief History of the
Indian Wars in New England, and "Reverend Stephen Williams Notebook." Hubbard and
Mather's sources are unclear, but were written during and/or directly after the war, and they
would have received their information from participants, while Reverend William’s account was
recorded some 50 years later, from a series of interviews with Jonathan Wells, who was sixteen
at the time of the battle. While all three of these accounts reflect the cultural biases so common
in English accounts of the period, other sources, as well as the archaeology conducted at Great
Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut have substantiated the general accuracy of their writing.11
By the Second Battle of Nipsachuck (Battle of Mattity Swamp) on the 2nd of July, 1676, the
English forces were clearly on the ascendency. The battle demonstrates Connecticut's aggressive
actions against the Narragansetts, which began with the Great Swamp Fight/Massacre in
December of 1675.12 However, it also provides a glimpse into various Indigenous peace
11

Kevin McBride, David Naumec, Ashley Bissonnette, Noah Feldman, Michael Derderian, Site Identification and
Documentary Project: The Battle of Great Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut, the 19th of May, 1676,
(Washington D.C.: National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program, 2017), 75-76.
12
While primary sources, such as Hubbard and Church, describe this event as the “Great Swamp Fight,” the event
consisted of an attack on a village consisting mostly of women and children; while numbers vary wildly, anywhere
from 300-1,000 non-combatants were either killed in the initial attack, or died from exposure after fleeing the
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overtures to the English (which I will discuss in the body of the work). Second, Nipsachuk may
have been an attempt, in part, to derail Native peace overtures, something that echoes in the
causes of the attack on Wissantinnewag- Peskeompskut two months earlier.
In the years leading up to hostilities, many attempts were made by Native leaders such as
Metacom to find common ground with the English. They used the English court system to
address grievances, but rarely met with success. This particular grievance was part of a
discussion between Metacom and the Deputy Governor of the Rhode Island Colony John Easton.
According to Easton Metacom stated: “…if 20 of their honest Indians testified that an
Englishman had done them wrong, it was as nothing; and if but one of their worst Indians
testified against any Indian or their king when it pleased the English, that was sufficient.” 13 By
combining historiography and archaeology, this paper will attempt to fully understand Native
American military and diplomatic strategies during King Philip’s War. These aspects of the war
have remained obscure for most Americans due in no small part to the paucity of writing
specifically about Indigenous participants in the war.14

settlement. As such, the event was re-cast as a massacre, not unlike the attack on Mystic in 1637, following the
writing of A Eulogy for Philip by William Apess in 1836.
13
John Easton and Paul Royster (editor), "A Relation of the Indian War, by Mr. Easton, of Rhode Island,
1675" (1675). Faculty Publications, UNL Libraries. 33. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/library science 33.
14
Lisa Brooks points to the dichotomy in Mary Rowlandson's stories, an English captive of the Nipmucs, and James
Printer, a Wampanoag scholar. Printer attended the Harvard Indian College and later became a printer. It was Printer
who produced John Eliot's translation of the King James Bible into the Algonquian language. Printer was a crucial
player in the negotiations for the release of Rowlandson, and Brooks mentions that had it not been for Printer's skill
as a negotiator and a printer, Rowlandson's story may never have come to light. "Rowlandson's prominence and
Printer's near absence in early American literature, and the historical reality of their intertwined lives may
metaphorically reflect the relationship between American literature and Native American history." From "Turning
the Looking Glass on King Philip's War: Locating American Literature in Native Space, American Literary History,
History, Historicism, and Historiography, Winter 2013, V. 25, n. 4

9
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Chapter 2 - Methodology
The overarching objective of this thesis is to create a comprehensive research project on King
Philip’s War (1675-77), with a distinct focus on Indigenous strategies and tactics, both military
and diplomatic, and which attempts to show that Indigenous strategies during the war were far
more complex, effective, and far-reaching than is indicated by the Eurocentric viewpoint
reflected in English primary sources. This thesis incorporates three complementary
methodologies – historical research, archaeological research, and ethnographic research – to
incorporate the Indigenous history of the war and its aftermath. These main objectives are met
through the completion of a series of scaffolded sub-goals, including, but not limited to:

1)

Incorporating Indigenous analysis of the war through ethnographic research with
members of the Aquinnah and Mashpee Wampanoag tribes, including Darius Coombs
(Director of Wampanoag and Eastern Woodlands Interpretation & Research at Plimoth
Plantation, Mashpee Wampanoag) and Kerri Helme (Guest Experience Manager for the
Wampanoag Homesite at Plimoth Plantation, Mashpee Wampanoag).

2)

Broadening our understanding of King Philip’s War through archaeological research,
including interviews with archaeologists, research of archaeological reports in state site
files, observation of archaeological fieldwork with Dr. Kevin McBride of the University
of Connecticut and his team at the Great Falls (Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut) Project
of the ABPP (American Battlefield Protection Program), and observations from monthly
meetings of the Grant Advisory Board in Montague, Massachusetts.
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3)

Reexamine the war from a broader perspective that includes the Indigenous history of
the war, with particular attention given to the fighting tactics and efforts at diplomacy on
the part of the Indigenous people involved in the war.

As mentioned above, this thesis will draw on three separate but related disciplines: history,
archaeology and ethnography.
I.

History

In recent decades, writers such as Jill Lepore (1998), James Drake (1999), Lisa Brooks
(2018), Christine DeLucia (2018), and others, have re-examined the war with an emphasis on
ethnohistory; the branch of anthropology concerned with the history of peoples and cultures,
especially non-Western ones. In a review of her book, Our Beloved Kin, Jon Parmenter wrote:
“Brooks demonstrates that by examining overlooked primary documents, emphasizing
previously neglected personalities, and detailing events-as-lived, [Brooks] provides a deeper
understanding of Indigenous “strategies and logics,” which in turn can tell us much of value that
is new. 15 This idea is the inspiration for this paper - the idea that we can reexamine historical
events by looking at overlooked or underused sources and a new, more accurate understanding of
past events can come to light. Bringing the disciplines of archaeology and ethnography further
enhances this practice. A primary source that has influenced a great deal of scholarly research
over the years is The Sovereignty and Goodness of God by Mary Rowlandson. Rowlandson’s
book was first published in Boston in 1682. It has been called America’s “First Best Seller.”
Rowlandson, albeit inadvertently, created the framework for a whole genre of literature, the

15

Jon Parmenter, book review in Ethnohistory, (2019), 66, no. 4, pp. 755-756 https://doi.org/10.1215/001418017683402
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captivity narrative. A close examination of her writing has provided some of the best available
information about the Pocasset Sunksqua 16 Weetamoo.
Revisiting Rowlandson’s narrative also provides glimpses into how an English colonial
woman viewed the world. Much of the primary sources which had been relied upon for such a
long time regarding the war are official writings such as court proceedings and the histories from
people such as William Hubbard, Cotton Mather, Increase Mather, and Daniel Gookin. These
histories were written not only from the perspective of a European male, but males who were all
Puritan ministers. These sources, and those that were produced in the decades and centuries after
the war, often contain the biases, prejudices, and perspectives that existed in the time the works
were produced. Indigenous people are often referred to as “savages” and “heathens.” A more
complete narrative of the war and its effects on all involved begins to take shape by:
● Revisiting the historiography of the war, including narratives from Indigenous
written sources such as the letter from James the Printer.
● Reviewing the official records of Plymouth Colony from the Massachusetts State
and Plymouth County Archives.
● Combining the study of these histories with archaeological and ethnographic
research.

16

Sunksqua is an Algonquian word that combines the words “sunk” meaning elevated and the word “squa” meaning
woman and it refers to a Native woman who serves as a sachem or chief. It can also indicate the wife of a chief.
Traditionally, among eastern Algonkian peoples, it was common for women as well as men to serve as chiefs.
Female leaders were also called, by the English squaw sachem. This term was often misinterpreted by colonial
leaders, whose gender-based preconceptions led them to falsely believe that the term simply referred to a sachem’s
wife, with no significant political power. http://1704.deerfield.history.museum>popups>glossary
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II.

Archaeology
In order to incorporate the archaeology of King Philip’s War in order to supplement the

information provided in various historical narratives, I reviewed archaeological state site files
and other sources at the Massachusetts Historical Commission, the Rhode Island Historic
Preservation and Heritage Commission, Plimoth-Patuxet (formerly Plimoth Plantation), and local
libraries in Cumberland, RI; Smithfield, RI; South Kingstown, RI; and other locations. In
addition, I journeyed to numerous meetings of the Grant Committee Advisory Board, held
monthly in Montague, at which were discussed issues of signage, funding, and updated
battlefield reports from Dr. McBride.17 I was also able to travel to two seperate locations and
witness the ongoing work of the battlefield archaeology survey establishing the English routes of
retreat by searching for musket balls and any other battle-related artifacts in the areas with Dr.
McBride. To obtain a better understanding of the period, I traveled to the Mashantucket Pequot
Museum and Research Center in Mashantucket, Connecticut on several occasions, including one
in September 2019, in which the museum sponsored a weekend of live displays with period
reenactments of wampum and projectile point production, along with early colonial industry. A
visit to Jade Luiz, curator at Plimoth-Patuxet provided a chance to view artifacts such as
weapons and armor used by English forces during the time period (see fig. 6 app. II).

17

The Battlefield Grant Advisory Board — composed of Jonathan Perry, (now former) Deputy THPO for the
Aquinnah Wampanoag; Liz Coleman of the Chaubunagungamaug Band of Nipmuc Indians (filling in for Vice
Chairman David Tall Pine White); Roger Long Toe Sheehan, Chief of the Elnu Abenaki; Doug Harris, the Deputy
THPO of the Narragansett; and David Brule of the Nolumbeka Project, as well as historical commissioners from
Montague, Greenfield, Gill, Northfield and Deerfield - is an advisory board created to manage and oversee the
National Parks Service American Battlefield Protection Program Grant awarded in accordance with 54 U.S.C.
380101-380103.
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III.

Ethnography
Formal and informal discussions with numerous members of the Aquinnah and Mashpee

Wampanoag Nations took place throughout the study period. The comments of those who chose
to go on the record and sign Bridgewater State University IRB Informed Consent forms are
formally referenced in the chapter on the ethnography of the war. These individuals include
Darius Coombs (Director of Wampanoag and Eastern Woodlands Interpretation & Research at
Plimoth Plantation, Mashpee Wampanoag) and Kerri Helme (Guest Experience Manager for the
Wampanoag Homesite at Plimoth Plantation, Mashpee Wampanoag). These interviews provided
important information on Indigenous histories of the war, including the buildup to the war, the
causes of the war, strategies and tactics during the war, the complexities of Indigenous social
structures at the time, the war’s aftermath, and the continuing effects of the war and settler
colonialism on Indigenous sovereignty.

14
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Chapter 3 – Warfare

The pre-contact Indigenous world was not the bloodthirsty “howling wilderness” that
existed in the imaginations of early European colonists, nor was it the “Paradise lost” where
people existed in a kind of Edenic bliss. Archaeological, osteological, and ethnohistoric accounts
exist of warfare reaching back thousands of years and these records can be found throughout the
major Indigenous cultural areas of North America.18 Methods and reasons for fighting were
influenced by environmental conditions, cultural norms, and the specifics of Indigenous polities
across the wide spectrum of tribal or group affiliations. The colonial powers lacked an
understanding of political and cultural complexities in the Indigenous world and often took a
dismissive view of Indigenous cultural norms relying instead on European beliefs, ideas, and
thoughts concerning the nature of violence and the conduct of war.19
A brief note on Strategy versus tactics. Both terms originated as military terminology.
The strategies being examined are overall war aims and overall diplomatic aims. How the war
was fought, attacks, raids, ambushes and such, fall under tactics. The overall strategic goal was
to drive the English out of Indigenous lands.

18

Richard J. Chacon and Rubén G. Mendoza, North American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence, Chacon
and Mendoza, eds. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007), pp. 5, 229-230.
19
David H. Dye and M. Franklin Keel, “The Portrayal of Native American Violence and Warfare: Who Speaks for
the Past?”, in The Ethics of Anthropology and Amerindian Research, Richard T. Chacon and Rubén Mendoza, eds.
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007), p.52

15
The environment was an obvious factor in Indigenous warfare tactics in the northeast
portion of the Eastern Woodlands area.20 The tactics developed by Indigenous people over the
millennia, referred to derisively by early European colonists as “skulking,” combined with the
acquisition of European firearms, made the Indigenous participants in King Philip’s War
formidable fighters. Daniel Gookin, a soldier and thirty-year Superintendent of Indigenous
Affairs for the Colony of Rhode Island, wrote:
“But it was found another matter of thing than expected; for our men could see no
enemy to shoot at, but yet felt their bullets out of the thick bushes where they lay in
ambushments. The enemy also used this stratagem, to apparel themselves from the waist
upwards with green boughs, that our Englishmen could not readily discern from the
natural bushes; this manner of fighting our men had little experience of, and hence were
under great disadvantage.”21
From the late Fall of 1675 until March of 1676, the English were at a loss to counter the
guerilla [skulking] tactics of their Indigenous enemies unless they had their Mohegan and Pequot
allies with them. The English forces22 repeatedly wandered into ambushes at bridge crossings,

20

The Woodland Cultural area is the area of North America that extends eastward from the Mississippi River
Valley East. It encompasses the area as far north as southern Canada and as far south as southernmost Florida.
21
Daniel Gookin, An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in the Years 1675,
1676, 1677, in Archaelogica Americana, Transactions and Collections of the American Antiquarian Society II,
(Cambridge, 1836) p. 441.
22
It is worth clarifying that Connecticut troops immediately embraced alliances with the Pequot, Mohegan and
others as allies at the start of the war, and thus were a more-or-less effective fighting force throughout the war. The
Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay Colonies did not take advantage of possible Indigenous allies, and suffered greatly
during the war as a result.
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bends in the road, and trails that were flanked with reeds, brush, and forest. These kinds of
attacks by the Indigenous forces resulted in the deaths of hundreds of militiamen.23
Colonial documents and twentieth century historical research based on those documents
generally assumed that Indigenous warriors were not dependable soldiers. According to these
documents, “savages committing brigandage,” while using “primitive” methods of warfare,
sought mainly to wreak vengeance and achieve glory. These pejorative terms were common
judgments in the colonial records and, until quite recently, in much of historiography.”24
Reasons for Indigenous people engaging in warfare also differed from European
rationales. Indigenous intersocietal conflict emphasized bravery and war honors through
individual combat, rather than conquest and mass body counts.25 According to Roger Williams:
“… Their Warres are farre lesse bloudy and devouring then the cruell Warres of Europe;
and seldome twenty slaine in a pitcht field: partly because when they fight in a wood every Tree
is a Bucklar [shield]. When they fight in a plaine, they fight with leaping and dancing, that
seldome an Arrow hits, and when a man is wounded, unlesse he that shot followes upon the
wounded, they soone retire and save the wounded: and yet having no Swords, nor Guns, all that
are slaine are commonly slain with great Valour and Courage: for the Conquerour ventures into
the thickest, and brings away the Head of his Enemy26
The stereotype of a “skulking” pattern of war is based on persistent small, partisan raids,
often without the consent or knowledge of a polities’ formal political structure or sanctioning

23

Julie A. Fisher and David J. Silverman, Ninigret, Sachem of the Niantics and Narragansetts: Diplomacy, War,
and the Balance of Power in Seventeenth-Century New England and Indian Country, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2014), p. 128.
24
Leroy V. Eid, “National” War Among Indians of Northeastern North America,” Canadian Review of American
Studies, 16, no. 2 (Summer 1985), p. 126
25
While accurate on a general level, this is also very much an over-simplification of Indigenous conflict during the
Contact period. While kin-based intermittent conflict characterized by raids and counter raids was common, there
are indications that there was something else going on as well - otherwise why would almost every native
community have a palisaded fort – in some cases prior to European contact? The Pequot and Mohegan, for example,
at the time of King Philip’s War, were fighting against their traditional enemies and according to their cultural ethos.
26
Roger Williams, A Key into the Language of America: or An help to the Language of the Natives in that part of
America called New England, Intro. Howard M Chapin, (Bedford, Ma.: Applewood Books, 1997) pp. 188-9.
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councils. However, in the case of King Philip’s War and Indigenous warfare in the northeast
region in general, these raids were always sanctioned, as they could eventually involve the entire
community. These raids usually involved small bands of ten or fewer individuals.27
[It is important at this point to distinguish amongst the tactics Indigenous forces were using. As
Eid has pointed out, “at certain decisive times the Indians were able to coalesce into impressively
large and successful armies that could perform well in large-scale conflicts.”28 While the raids
against colonial towns were conducted as small scale operations, the need for a larger organized
force was seen by people, particularly Metacom, who spent a great deal of time creating alliances
with various groups among the Wampanoag, Narragansett, and Nipmuc nations.
As trade expanded between Indigenous nations and European colonists, the former
acquired firearms at a rapid pace following the Pequot War. Indigenous fighters combined their
speed and stealth with the weapon's power, adjusting quickly to European-style warfare, while
still maintaining the methods which they had employed in inter-tribal warfare for millennia,
knowing very well how to counter English weapons and tactics. With regards to the adapting of
European firearms, Connecticut Deputy Governor William Leete stated they were “so accurate
marks men above our own men, to doe execution, whereby more of ours are like to fall, rather
than of theirs, unless the Lord by special providence, do deliver them into our hands.” 29
The bow and arrow had a superior rate of fire to the flintlock and muskets of 17th century
manufacture, but the firearm allowed for a more direct path towards the target. Both weapons kill

27

Leroy V. Eid, “National” War Among Indians,” p.129, David H. Dye and M. Franklin Keel, “The Portrayal of
Native American Violence and Warfare: Who Speaks for the Past?”, in The Ethics of Anthropology and Amerindian
Research: Reporting on Environmental Degradation and Warfare, eds. Richard J, Chacon and Rubén G, Mendoza,
(New York: Springer, 2012). P.65. There are disagreements amongst scholars over the level of intensity of and the
causes of those conflicts much of which will remain in the realm of theoretical discussion.
28
Eid, “National War,” p. 129.
29
William Leete, as quoted by Armstrong Starkey in European and Native American Warfare 1675 – 1815,
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), p. 68.
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at a distance, but the bow and arrow were more limited in range (ca. 60 yards) than muskets and
flintlocks (ca. 100 yards, except in the case of scattershot). The bow and arrow relies on a more
indirect arc making it susceptible to deflection from branches and brush, whereas the heavy lead
projectile fired from a firearm traveled much faster and was less susceptible to deflection from
light interference such as a branch.30 In close quarter combat, the firearm could be loaded with
multiple smaller projectiles to produce a greater probability of hitting one or more targets with a
single discharge (i.e. “scattershot”). This practice is also reflected in the archaeological record, as
patterns of small caliber musket balls which displayed facets from being jammed together in the
barrel during firing were found at Wissatinnewag-Peskeompskut by Dr. Kevin McBride. The
English saw how quickly the Native people adapted to the firearms and how proficient they were
in their use and began to create laws and issue proclamations banning the sale or trade of
weapons to the Indigenous peoples, despite technically being at peace with local Indigenous
nations. This further indicates that the state of relations between English colonists in the region
and local Indigenous nations was not one of peace, but of settler colonialists attempting to assert
their dominance over an Indigenous population. Indigenous communities quickly overcame this
problem by trading with the Dutch to the south and the French in the north who had no such
restrictions and were undoubtedly happy with the fact these weapons were going to make it
harder on their English competitors. They also learned to disregard the matchlock which, while
inexpensive, relied on a lighted match that proved nearly useless in wet weather. The glow of the
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match was not conducive to remaining concealed in the dense underbrush and wooded areas
where they preferred to fight. 31
Gookin described New Englanders at the start of King Philip's war as making "a nothing
of the Indians ... many reckoned it was no other but Veni, vidi, vici." However, the English
quickly "found another manner of thing than was expected ... [for they] could not discern or find
an enemy to fight with yet were galled by the enemy." Indeed, Gookin went on to claim that only
"after our Indians went out, the balance turned of the English side." For God allowed, said
Gookin, a few (comparatively) of naked men to do what "numbers of men well-armed and
provided, endowed with courage and valor" could not. Gookin noted the discipline of the
Indigenous soldiers, their ability to remain quiet and move stealthily across the terrain. 32
Indigenous warriors often attacked settlements at dawn while most people were either
still asleep or just beginning their day. People in this situation would be at their most vulnerable
and therefore attacks during this portion of the day would have a greater chance for success.
Metacom’s forces often attacked towns at dawn, pinning defenders down in garrisons and
blockhouses while they burned everything down. As mentioned above, this tactic was employed
as an overall strategy to erase colonists’ connection to the land and deny them their place in the
region, as addressed above on page 15 of the thesis. In the three-month period of January to
March 1676, eight towns, Medfield, Weymouth, Warwick, Marlborough, Rehoboth, Swansea,
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Providence, and Groton were destroyed.33 Mary Rowlandson’s account of her captivity provides
great detail into how these raids occurred:
“Their first coming was about sun-rising. Hearing the noise of some guns we looked out;
several houses were burning and the smoke ascending to heaven…The Indians getting up on the
roof of the barn, had advantage to shoot at them over their fortification.” Describing the attack on
her own home Rowlandson related that “The house stood upon the edge of a hill; some of the
Indians got behind the hill, others onto the barn, and others behind anything that would shelter
them; from all which places they shot against the house…they had been about the house before
they prevailed to fire it, which they did with flax and hemp which they brought out of the
barn…[they] fired it once, and one [colonist] ventured out and quenched it, but they quickly fired
it again, and that took.”34
The tactics and weapons employed by the Indigenous combatants in southern New
England certainly could have led to much larger losses for the English had the Indigenous
fighters chosen a more unrestricted form of warfare. The attacks on the towns can be seen as a
continuation of Indigenous warfare that had existed long before European contact. Raids were a
means to obtain needed supplies, while at the same time denying the opposition of those same
supplies. Hostages were often taken as bargaining chips and even adoption into the tribal group.
The “skulking” way the Indigenous forces fought was natural for them. Relying heavily on
hunting required the skills needed to stalk, advance on, and dispatch the quarry as quickly and
efficiently as possible. Whether hunting deer or humans, the same methods apply. As previously
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discussed, contemporaries such as Daniel Gookin, Roger Williams, and William Harris saw the
Indigenous tactics as superior to the English methods of open combat and the English saw their
greatest successes against the Indigenous forces when they employed Indigenous allies and
similar Indigenous tactics themselves.
Both English and Indigenous communities toiled to maintain their food supplies during
wartime, and both targeted foodstuffs of the enemy as a military strategy. Both Indigenous and
English forces targeted foodstuffs as a military strategy—which is why both sides had to
repeatedly forage for corn, which then allowed for the tracking of troop movements. For
example, Indigenous forces which had originally retreated to Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut
returned to Nipsachuck (Matitty Swamp) to obtain food stores which had been hidden there. It
was these troop movements which allowed the English forces to ambush them there. The Winter
of 1675 - 1676 was one of “severe hunger and famine” for both colonial and Indigenous
communities.35 Targeting the enemies’ crops and animals formed an integral component of
military planning for both sides. After the Lancaster strike, Rowlandson described “the waste”
the Indians made “of Horses, Cattle, Sheep, Swine, Calves, Lambs, Roasting Pigs, and Fowls . . .
some roasting, some lying and burning, and some boyling to feed our merciless Enemies.” 36
Livestock also symbolized the “relentless advance of English settlements” and became targets of
Indigenous anger and frustration. 37In keeping with contemporary practice, Indigenous fighters
butchered and ate what they could carry, and maimed or killed outright what they could not.

35

Kevin McBride et.al., “Technical Report: 1676 Battle of Great Falls / Wissantinnewag - Peskeompskut Site
Identfication and Evaluation Project Phase II, National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program, GA
2287-18-007 October 30, 2020. p. 72.
36
Mary Rowlandson, The Account of Mary Rowlandson, p.71.
37
Virginia DeJohn Anderson, “King Philip’s Herds: Indians, Colonists and the Problem of Livestock in Early New
England,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 51, no. 4, (October 1994) pp. 661 - 662.

22
Crops, too, drew the attention of belligerents. During Rowlandson’s seventh remove, Indigenous
forces “spread themselves over the deserted English fields, gleaning” the wheat, corn, and
groundnuts.
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Chapter 4 - Diplomacy

Metacom most likely saw an untenable situation in front of him. Much of the land of
which his people were stewards under his father 8sâmeeqan and his brother, Wamsutta, was
gone, and these once sizable lands continued to shrink. Metacom assumed power after the death
of his brother Wamsutta known by the colonists as Alexander. Both Metacom and Wamsutta’s
wife, Weetamoo, believed Wamsutta had been poisoned at the hands of Plymouth Colony
officials when he became ill and died shortly after his release by colonial officials, the same
officials who had marched him from his home at gunpoint a few days earlier for questioning in
Plymouth.38
Metacom, who was Pokanoket, gained respect among other Wampanoag nations, such as
the Sakonnet under Weetamoo, the Pocasset under Quaiapen, and the Nemasket under
Tuspaquin. He did this by striking against external enemies, entering strategic marriages,
engaging in regional diplomacy, and as he was willing to take a confrontational stance against
the English. Metacom built alliances by drawing off disenfranchised tribute payers from the
Narragansetts, strengthening his kinship ties with the Nipmuc, and developing relationships with
Eastern Narragansett Sachems whose power had waned, while Ninigret, the leader of the
Niantics and Western Narragansett, also saw his power increase.39 Metacom was drawing the
Narragansetts into his orbit after a schism that began in the first decades of the 17th century.
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Under Canonicus and Miantonomi, the Narragansetts had tried to dominate the Wampanoag
communities who had been decimated by disease. 8sâmeeqan and his people had been driven
from the head of Narragansett Bay eastward into the Mt. Hope peninsula. This Narragansett
aggression led to 8sâmeeqan’s alliance with the Plymouth Bay Colony in 1621.40
In May of 1666, Philip reached out to the Mauntauketts of Long Island to wrest them
away from Ninigret who had forced them to pay tribute. Philip sent a letter to the Mauntauketts
in English, written by his English educated Massachusett scribe, John Sassamon. He then tried to
gain influence over the Nipmuc of the Quantisset community located in the Quinebaug River
Valley. The Quantisset Nipmuc were tributaries to Quaiapin, Ninigret’s sister and a Narragansett
Sachem (Sunksquaw) in her own right. Metacom promised them a tribute free alliance. Ninigret
and Quaiapin ended that idea by sending hundreds of her people on a bloodless but destructive
raid on the Quantisset ending Metacom’s attempts at an alliance.41
In the days prior to the attack on Swansea, John Easton, then the Deputy Governor of
Rhode Island, met with Philip to discuss ways to avoid a war that was being seen as increasingly
unavoidable by both sides. While Easton’s mission was to avoid war, Philip insisted on using the
opportunity to air the many grievances he and his people harbored. A full relation of Philip’s
grievances to Easton may be found in Appendix 1 of this thesis. In his Relation of the Indian
War, Easton wrote:
“…but Philip charged it to be dishonesty in us to put off the hearing of their
complaints; and therefore, we consented to hear them. They said they had been the first in
doing good to the English, and the English the first in doing wrong; they said when the
English first came, their kings’ father [Ousamequin] was as a great man and the English
as a little child. He constrained other Indians from wronging the English and gave them
40
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corn and showed them how to plant and was free to do them any good and had let them
have 100 times more land than now the king had for his own people.” 42

Easton’s Relation of the Indian War begins with a retelling of the circumstances, to the
degree they were known, surrounding the death of a Christianized Massachusett named John
Sassamon in “the Winter of 1674.” He recounted the story of the coroner’s inquest, the arrest,
conviction and subsequent execution of three Wampanoags for Sassamon’s murder. Although it
is satisfying to tie the cause of the war to the death of one man, its broader origins remained
rooted in issues connected to disease, trade, land, migration, and shifting alliances. It was a
contributing factor, but the movement and planning for war was already well underway.
Sassamon had been an interpreter for Metacom, but Metacom had come to distrust him because
of his close ties with Colonial authorities.43
After the Pokanoket Wampanoag attack on Swansea in late June 1675, Metacom’s forces
fled to the territories of the Sakonnet Wampanoag, led by the Sunksquaw Awashonks and the
Pocasset Wampanoag territory led by the Sunksquaw Weetamoo. Had Plymouth ceased its
pursuit and attempted to negotiate with the Sakonnet and the Pocasset, they may have weakened
Metacom. Instead, they pursued Metacom’s people into Sakonnet and Pocasset territory thus
pushing those Wampanoags into Metacom’s ranks.44
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In the Fall of 1675, Plymouth enslaved over two hundred Wampanoag noncombatants
who had surrendered to them. At the same time, English colonists in the upper Connecticut River
Valley demanded that the “Friend Indians” who had previously fought with the English against
the Nipmuc surrender their guns. This drove the River people into an alliance with Metacom.
The overbearing tactics of the English, along with Metacom’s multi-tribal diplomacy, turned the
English fears of a pan-Indian uprising into a reality.45
Similar to what often occurred in Europe, marriage was a way to both create and shore
up alliances. In August of 1675, the Narragansetts, against their agreement with the English, took
in Weetamoo and approximately 100 of her people. Either just before or just after this event
Weetamoo married the Narragansett Sachem Quinnapin,46 the nephew of Narragansett Sachem
Canonicus. Weetamoo was already regarded as a powerful Wampanoag leader and the widow of
Metacom’s brother Wamsutta. This development put the Narragansett into a commitment to
defend her people.47
As the year 1675 turned into 1676, the Indigenous forces had acquitted themselves very
well. Many were not ready to give up the fight. After a Coalition raid on the town of Medfield,
Massachusetts, on February 21, 1676, a note was found pinned to a bridge post which said:
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“ Know by this paper, that the Indians that thou hast provoked to wrath and anger will
war this 21 years if you will. There are many Indians yet. We come 300 at this time. You must
consider the Indians lose nothing but their life. You must lose your fair houses and cattle.” 48
At the same time, diplomatic overtures were being conducted by both sides. The colony
of Connecticut for example was engaged in diplomacy with the coalition forces assembled at
Peskeompskut, a situation that may have been a reason why Coalition guards were so few on the
morning of May 16 allowing the attack on Peskeompskut to be carried out with surprise.
Their “skulking way of war” and raids on numerous towns were increasing the level of
fear and desperation on the part of the English. But it was coming at a cost. Disease, exposure,
and lack of adequate food were taking a huge toll on both sides. Connecticut had been harassing
the Narragansett steadily since the massacre in the Great Swamp in December of 1675.49 This
drove survivors into the interior with many of them joining other displaced groups living in and
around the Nipmuc villages of Wissantinnewag and Peskeompskut located in the modern-day
town of Gill, Massachusetts.50
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Chapter 5 – The Archeology of King Philip’s War

Archaeology is, according to Neusius and Gross, “the study of past human behavior and
culture through the analysis of material remains.”51 This is a good description of archaeology’s
primary role as one of the four main subdisciplines of anthropology, but it is incomplete.
Archaeology also has an important role to play in historical research. It can provide insight and
answer questions about events that may or may not be found in the historical (written) record. It
can verify or challenge existing narratives. One focus of this paper is on Indigenous fighting
strategies as they pertained to King Philip’s War, and, in this case, battlefield archaeology has
provided some valuable information. Battlefield Archaeology as the title implies is concerned
with the identification and study of sites where conflicts took place and identifying
archaeological data for analysis. While information can, and should be, obtained from historical
records associated with the battlefield/event, the archaeology of a battlefield allows battlefield
historians and archaeologists to reconstruct and assess the veracity of these historical accounts,
and to fill any gaps in the historical record. Battlefield archaeology can provide not only a
reconstruction of the event, but it can provide a more dynamic interpretation of the battlefield.52
Incorporating archaeology also helps us to engage in the process of decolonizing history,
particularly as it relates to King Philip’s War and other Indigenous-Colonial conflicts. The
colonial powers lacked an understanding of political and cultural complexities in the Native
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American world and often took a dismissive view of Indigenous cultural norms, relying instead
on European beliefs, ideas, and thoughts concerning the nature of violence and the conduct of
war.”53
Poly-communal Archaeology
Twenty-first century archaeologists face two practical challenges: decolonizing a
discipline deeply rooted in the colonial worldview and engaging with descendent communities
about the meaning, value, and treatment of their heritage sites. In North America, much of the
research about pre- and post-contact Indigenous peoples has marginalized and erased them from
history and from the present day. This is due in large part to the relegation of Indigenous peoples
to “prehistoric” periods, particularly here in the Northeast. An overwhelmingly Euroamerican
narrative emerged after initial colonization, and research questions and methodologies that did
not require (in the minds of researchers) “seeing” Native peoples as agents in the past or the
present. This is particularly problematic in the New England region of the Northeastern United
States which has a longer colonial history than many other regions of the continent, a longer
history of archaeological practice than elsewhere in North America, and a “complex
contemporary social matrix of Native and non-Native communities and institutions.”54 In the
case of the King Philip’s War research conducted by Dr. Kevin McBride and his team,
referenced and observed throughout this thesis, Dr. McBride embraces a poly-communal
approach to archaeological investigation, as developed by Siobhan Hart.55 This approach to
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archaeology focuses on “building a community of stakeholders - a heritage community - by
engaging multiple stakeholders in heritage work rooted in place.”56 This is very important, as
there are often multiple stakeholders with differing motives, agendas, heritages and ideas, and
therefore require sustained dialogue between stakeholders. Dr. McBride’s work puts this
approach into practice through regular meetings of the Grant Advisory Board, whose members
include town historians, archaeologists, and representatives from the Elnu Abenaki,
Narragansett, Nipmuc, Stockbridge-Munsee Mohican, and Wampanoag of Gay Head/Aquinnah
tribal nations.
Battlefield Archaeology

The discipline of Battlefield Archaeology is concerned primarily with the identification
and study of sites where conflicts took place, and the archaeological signature of the event. This
requires gathering information from historical records associated with the battlefield including
troop dispositions and numbers, the order of battle (command structure, strength and disposition
of personnel and equipment), as well as any undocumented evidence of an action or battle
gathered from archaeological investigations. The archaeology of a battlefield allows battlefield
historians and archaeologists to reconstruct the progress of a battle, assess the veracity of
historical accounts of the battle, and fill any gaps in the historical record. Battlefield archaeology
also seeks to move beyond simple reconstruction of the battlefield event and move toward a
more dynamic interpretation of the battlefield.57
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“Each action identified in the historical narrative and timeline has a distinct spatial and
material signature that when correlated with the battlefield timeline can be sequenced in
time and space. Once the battle actions are arranged in their correct chronological and
spatial order, a dynamic reconstruction of the battlefield can be achieved.” 58

This approach generally applies to Contact and post-Contact archaeology, as large-scale conflicts
were incredibly rare in the pre-Contact period, and may not have left behind much evidence in
the archaeological record. In general, based on archaeological and ethnohistoric documentation,
only a few warriors would be killed in battle and the majority of prisoners, mainly women and
children, would be adopted or enslaved. These patterns changed over time and space as
circumstances demanded, but overall Indigenous warfare prior to European contact did not
embrace wholesale slaughter like that perpetrated by colonial militias. Prior to contact, people in
the Eastern Woodlands used the same arrows, celts, and knives used when hunting, working
wood, and performing other essential domestic tasks. No unusual skills or special materials were
necessary to fashion war clubs designed solely for fighting. All of the men were by necessity as
hunters, proficient in the use of their weapons, making every able-bodied man a potential
warrior; that is, no special training was necessary. Raiding parties were drawn from the
inhabitants of local communities; distinctive barracks where soldiers resided and armories where
weapons were made, repaired, and stored did not exist.59
Single catastrophic attacks resulting in the deaths of most or all community members
have not been identified in the Eastern Woodlands. Raids of that kind would have required large
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groups of warriors to overpower their adversaries, even when surprise was achieved. While such
massacres leave a distinctive archaeological signature, the likelihood of finding such skeletons is
low, assuming the attacks took place infrequently and left few, if any, survivors to bury the
dead.60
Several years ago, Dr. Kevin McBride from the University of Connecticut and his team
began conducting archaeological research into the Battle of Great Falls / Wissantinnewag –
Peskeompskut. This particular battle can be seen as one of the key turning points in the war. The
Town of Montague, with support of the Historical Commissioners from the Towns of Deerfield,
Gill, Greenfield, Montague, and Northfield along with representatives from the Elnu Abenaki,
Narragansett, Nipmuc, Stockbridge-Munsee Mohican, and Wampanoag of Gay Head/Aquinnah
nations received a Site Identification and Documentation grant (GA-2287-14-012) from the
National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program (NPS ABPP) to conduct a preInventory Research and Documentation project to identify the likely locations of the King
Philip‘s War Peskeompskut (Turners Falls) Battlefield and associated sites.61
The scope of the project was to conduct a battlefield survey to “locate, sequence, and
document” battlefield actions over a designated area and assess the sites eligibility for listing on
the National Register of Historic Places.62
Soldiers, residents and even the clergy in nearby Hadley, Massachusetts had grown
increasingly frustrated with the recent peace talks between Connecticut, Plymouth, and Coalition
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members. Many were displaced from battles with Metacom’s men in Greenfield and Deerfield
and wished to retaliate. After Indigenous warriors raided nearby Hatfield and carried off cattle,
Captain William Turner, commander of the Hadley garrison, decided to take action despite the
instructions from his superiors. The English attacked Peskeompskut Village near daybreak
killing hundreds, some from gunfire and many others from drowning in the Connecticut River as
they tried to flee. The attack destroyed critical food and military supplies. Coalition forces from
nearby villages responded and mounted a series of well-planned and well-coordinated
counterattacks and ambushes against the retreating English. The success of Coalition
counterattacks is reflected in the English casualty rate of between 45-55 percent (39 killed 29
wounded) out of an estimated 120-150 soldiers. By day's end, Coalition forces held the
battlefield and exacted a steep price from the English for their attack on Peskeompskut.
Nonetheless the battle was the beginning of a process that resulted in the dissolution of the
Native Coalition. 63 The area of battle stretches for approximately 6.5 miles from the Riverside
area of Gill, Massachusetts to the Deerfield River Ford at the confluence of the Green and
Deerfield Rivers in Greenfield.64 Using metal detectors, metal detecting pin pointers, GPS, and
GIS software, researchers have been able to locate musket balls, horse tack, and other artifacts
from the battle, and reconstruct many aspects of the battle, including the likely routes the English
took in their retreat. Collections of dropped, faceted, and impacted musket balls of varying
calibers tell a story of skirmishes and ambushes along a route that followed Cherry Rum Brook
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to the Greene and Deerfield Rivers. Some are unmarked and may have been dropped, and some
are misshapen as the result of an impact, while others are faceted, likely as a result of multiple
small-caliber musket balls being loaded together and fired in a “scatter shot” fashion, not unlike
a shotgun (see appendix 2).
Musket Ball Analysis
The Contact and post-Contact periods are where battlefield archaeology works best..
“Knowing the diameter of a musket ball, we can determine what general type of gun it was used
with. Being able to identify what it hit puts it in context with the location found. Looking at
groups of musket balls of the same general sizes and impact patterns can be used to identify site
features such as tree, rocks, fence rails and so forth. Combining all of this data yields a very
accurate interpretation of the site.”65
Five hundred and forty-eight lead musket balls were recovered from the Battle of Great
Falls battlefield Phase I and Phase II surveys.. Both Indigenous Coalition and English forces
during the war generally carried similar arms. This makes it difficult to associate the nature and
distribution of lead shot across the Great Falls battlefield with either Coalition or colonial forces.
It is also difficult to determine which side fired particular projectiles, or which caliber of firearm
was used or preferred by either side. Fighting during the Battle of Great Fall was asymmetrical 66
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and it is entirely possible the battlefield was traversed by various combatants several times,
making it difficult to attribute lead shot to one side or the other. 67
In one of the most intriguing reconstructions from the battle, artifacts from the area
known as Upper Factory Hollow suggest that at least some of the retreating colonial forces came
under sustained attack from coalition forces resulting in three, possibly four, soldiers being
unhorsed. The mounted English soldiers ascended the steep slope, known as the Swales, from
Lower Factory Hollow attempting to escape the Coalition forces in close pursuit. After being
unhorsed by larger caliber weapons, they were forced to fight from either below or behind their
fallen horses, as evidenced by the distribution of musket balls and horse tack in the area (see fig.
2, 3and 4, app. II). What also appears to have been happening is that the Coalition forces closed
in on them, and fired at them at closer range, using smaller caliber musket balls packed together
into muskets (see fig. 5, app. II), as evidenced by the presence and distribution of faceted,
smaller-caliber shot. Remaining evidence of impacted, faceted and dropped musket balls
indicates a scattered pattern of retreat, as Turner’s soldiers (Turner himself was killed at Green
River Ford, west of Factory Hollow) panicked and ran. All told, Indigenous coalition forces
(primarily Narragansett, Wampanoag, Pocumtuc and other valley communities) killed 39
members of the retreating colonial forces.68 A full listing of the musket balls from Factory
Hollow may be found in Appendix II.
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Kevin McBride, David Naumec, Ashley Bissonnette, Noah Fellman, Technical Report, 1 Site Identification and
Evaluation Project Phase II, p. 10.
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Douglas Edward Leach, A Rhode Islander Reports on King Philip’s War: The Second William Harris Letter of
August 1676, (Providence: The Rhode Island Historical Society, 1963), p. 80. Leach states “Most amazing is the
general agreement on the number...Harris, Mather, and Hubbard all claim 38 were killed.” Another source put it at
38 plus Captain Turner.
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Restoring Balance – Indigenous Strategies in King Philip’s War

Chapter 6 – Ethnography

The Wampanoag people regard this region as the land of the dawn. The name
Wampanoag means “People of the First Light.”69 Increase Mather, an often-cited primary source
for King Philip’s War, considered this land “the new English Israel” seated in “these goings
down of the sun.” 70 These are two very different concepts. Perhaps more than any other single
item, land sat at the center of the differences that ultimately led to war and the beginning of the
marginalization and attempted eradication of a way of life.
In June of 2019, I sat down with Darius Coombs, Director of Wampanoag and Eastern
Woodlands Interpretation & Research at Plimoth Patuxet, Mashpee Wampanoag, and Kerri
Helme, Guest Experience Manager for the Wampanoag Homesite at Plimoth Patuxet, Mashpee
Wampanoag. Both of them shared the history of the war as their history which it is. My
interview was based on a series of questions regarding the way the war is remembered, the way it
has been written about, and what they, as Indigenous people wish to add to the lessons learned.
(see Appendix I for a list of sample questions, as well as other IRB materials, including signed
informed consent documents)
Our discussions covered a wide range of issues, including issues dating to before the war,
which made the war inevitable. In most cases, these same issues were carried into the war and
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Nancy Eldredge, Nauset Wampanoag and Penobscot, Who Are the Wampanoag?
https://www.plimoth.org/learn/just-kids/homework-help/who-are-wampanoag
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Increase Mather, “A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New England,” in So Dreadful a Judgement:
Puritan Responses to King Philip’s War, eds. Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, (Middletown: Wesleyan
University Press, 1978), p. 86. See also Brooks, Our Beloved Kin, p. 11.
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were amplified by the war’s outcome. Epidemics and disease began before the first permanent
English settlement in Patuxet, re-named Plimouth by the English in 1620. An outbreak of disease
began in 1617 and continued until 1619. Coombs suggests that the disease was rat-born and
made its way to North America on French trading ships that landed in Maine. The footprint of
the disease suggests to him that it started in Maine and worked its way south into Massachusetts
and parts of Rhode Island but ended at the edge of Narragansett Bay. Additionally, the Aquinnah
Wampanoag largely escaped it, as they were separated by the waters of Vineyard Sound. Helme
pointed to the arrival of zoonotic disease with the arrival of livestock native to Europe, but not to
North America. Disease, according to Coombs, continued to decimate the Indigenous
populations. There were smaller outbreaks in 1623 and again in 1630. During the war, disease
and starvation exacted a much higher toll on the Indigenous nations fighting in King Philip’s war
than actual combat.
If you were to attempt to find a single issue that encapsulates almost everything else, it
would be land. The arrival of people from Europe, first a trickle then as a flood, created a
demand for it. Concepts of land between the colonists and the Indigenous people could not have
been more dissimilar. The English “purchased” the land from people who had no understanding
of frame of reference to discern what was taking place. They learned quickly enough and began
to use the English court system to try and protect their rights. Indigenous people used their own
people educated in English ways to help them. People like John Sassamon and James the Printer
learned to read and write English. They sometimes functioned as scribes for their Sachems. Since
the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, the English had very definitive concepts of land and land
ownership. It was something to be purchased and developed. They erected fences, built
permanent homes and barns, and forbade anyone to trespass, hunt, or fish upon the land they
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owned without permission. For the Indigenous people, land is a part of who they are. They come
from it. They return to it. It is their ancestors. It is sacred. For the Indigenous people, losing
access to the land resulted in loss of hunting, fishing, and water rights, loss of arable farming
land. While the English maintained strict control over the land, they had no problem with cattle
and pigs roaming far and wide, a practice that often resulted in the destruction of Indigenous
food sources such as clam beds and their own fields of corn. An issue concerning enough that
Metacom brought it up in his meeting with John Easton just before the outbreak of open
hostilities.71
Another issue that is still prevalent today involves identity. I mentioned to Coombs about
putting the Native American story into the history of America. His comments were enlightening.
“We are still here,” said Coombs. He was referring to Native Americans identification with their
tribes and nations. “If you ask me who I am, I will tell you I am Mashpee Wampanoag.”
America, according to Coombs, is the term given to this part of North America by the colonists.
Indigenous people were here 12,000 years ago, long before the term existed and to this day they
identify with their tribal affiliations. It is who they are.
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A lengthy segment of Easton’s A Relation of the War, can be found in appendix I. In it, he listed the many
grievances Metacom and the indigenous people had.
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Conclusion
King Philip’s War ended in Southern New England 345 years ago. The larger regional
conflict that it ignited continued in Northern New England for decades. What makes this War so
important for study and understanding is the ripple effect of the war’s end. With that end came
the end of any possibility, however remote it may have been, of Indigenous Sovereignty. The
Indigenous people became the “others,” those that needed to be conquered, defeated, forced to
adopt European ways and the European God. Indigenous survivors of the conflict were forced to
assimilate or leave. Many more, including Wootonekanuske, the wife of Metacom, along with
his then 10-year-old son were sold into slavery, sent from their home never to be heard from
again. The mistreatment of the Indigenous people of North America continued well into the 20th
century. The actions of the 17th century New England colonies became a template for how the
Colonial and later United States Governments would treat the myriad Indigenous nations that
live in North America.
There is a need to understand our past through the history of all of its participants. A
multicultural and interdisciplinary examination of events can lead to a view of our past that is
closer to the actual experienced events, and therefore truer, than those that have been synthesized
and sanitized by the narratives of the dominant or “victorious” cultures. At the same time, it is
incumbent on researchers, scholars and all involved, to follow the evidence faithfully and not try
to force a popular notion that lacks evidence.
While the name Philip was bestowed by the colonial authorities as a show of respect.
Metacom was believed to have been given the nickname of “King Philip” by the Puritans,
because of what they saw as his “haughty mannerisms,” similar to the hated Catholic King Philip
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II of Spain.72 The first reference to the war as “Philip’s War” does not appear in print until 1716
when Benjamin Church’s son, Thomas, published his father’s recollections in a book titled
Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip’s War. This was the same Benjamin Church who, on
August 12, 1676, led an expedition assembled to search for and locate Metacom. Metacom was
found in a swamp near modern day Mt. Hope in Rhode Island. A Pocasset Wampanoag named
John Alderman shot Metacom through the heart ending his life and marking an official end, as
the colonial authorities saw it, to the war. Tragically, it can also be seen as a symbolic beginning
to a centuries long struggle for the Indigenous people across North America. In fact, the struggle
had begun decades earlier. King Philip’s War was an inevitable outcome of that struggle.
Throughout this research, I have learned much about the man most remembered as King
Philip. It has also suggested many other avenues of study both directly related to the war and
some further research into some of the personalities from the war. For me, Metacom is no longer
an abstraction, someone from long ago. I’ve come to see him as a flesh and blood inspiration.
The person who stands up and says “enough.” I have learned about the incredible women known
as Weetamoo. I have learned much about the ongoing struggles of people in my own community.
I have developed a fuller understanding of how the Indigenous people lived, worked and
struggled to maintain their footing on the land that was theirs for untold millennia. That struggle
continues to this day.
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King Philip’s War, https://www.warpaths2peacepipes.com/the-indian-wars/king-philips-war.htm
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Appendix I

Background – A Relation of the Indian War

Approximately one week before the attack on Swansea, Metacom agreed to meet with the Rhode
Island Colony’s Deputy Governor John Easton The excerpt below is lengthy but it is about as
close as we can hope to come to hearing Metacom speak and give us his argument for why war
came.73
“Then to endeavor to prevent it [war], we sent a man to Philip to say that if he would
come to the ferry, we would come over to speak with him. About four miles we had to
come thither. Our messenger came to them; they were not aware of it and behaved
themselves as furious but suddenly were appeased when they understood who he was and
what he came for. Philip called his council and agreed to come to us; he came himself
unarmed and about 40 of his men armed. Then five of us went over; three were
magistrates. We sat very friendly together. We told him our business was to endeavor that
they might not receive or do wrong. They said that was well—they had done no wrong,
the English wronged them. We said we knew—the English said the Indians wronged
them and the Indians said the English wronged them, but our desire was the quarrel might
rightly be decided in the best way, and not as dogs decided their quarrels. The Indians
owned that fighting was the worst way; then they propounded how right might take place,
we said by arbitration. They said all English agreed against them, and so by arbitration
they had had much wrong, many miles square of land so taken from them; for English
would have English arbitrators, and once they were persuaded to give in their arms, that
thereby jealousy might be removed, and the English having their arms would not deliver
them as they had promised, until they consented to pay a 100 pounds,74 and now they had
73

John Easton, “A Relation of the Indian War, by Mr. John Easton, of Rhode Island,” 1675, Paul Royster, ed.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/33 This is a modern English language version provided by Paul
Royster. Royster provides an appendix with the original language.
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The reference to the £100 refers to a sequence of events in 1671. In April 1671, Metacom was questioned at
Taunton, about a possible attack, and he was forced to surrender the weapons that various Wampanoags had secured
from the English. But Metacom may have used his influence to encourage other tribes in the area to resist. When
they refused to surrender their arms, the Plymouth Colony made ready for war. A last-ditch effort to forestall
fighting resulted in a meeting in September 1671, attended by the leaders of Plymouth and the Wampanoags, as well
as the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut. Metacom apparently had little choice but to accept the terms
offered him: to pay a fine of £100 to the colony, to agree to follow the colony's advice before resorting to war or
selling land, and to accept the authority of royal government and of Plymouth over his tribe. It is quite clear that
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not so much land or money, that they were as good to be killed as to leave all their
livelihood. We said they might choose an Indian king, and the English might choose the
Governor of New York that neither had cause to say either were parties in the difference.
They said they had not heard of that way, and said we honestly spoke, so we were
persuaded if that way had been tendered, they would have accepted. We did endeavor not
to hear their complaints, and said it was not convenient for us now to consider of; but to
endeavor to prevent war, we said to them when in war against the English blood was spilt
that engaged all Englishmen, for we were to be all under one king. We knew what their
complaints would be, and in our colony had removed some of them in sending for Indian
rulers insofar as the crime concerned Indians’ lives, which they very lovingly accepted,
and agreed with us to their execution, and said so they were able to satisfy their subjects
when they knew an Indian suffered duly, but said in whatever was only between their
Indians and not in townships that we had purchased, they would not have us prosecute,
and that they had a great fear lest any of their Indians should be called or forced to be
Christian Indians. They said that such were in everything more mischievous, only
dissemblers, and that then the English made them not subject to their own kings, and by
their lying to wrong their kings. We knew it to be true, and we promising them that
however in government to Indians all should be alike and that we knew it was our king’s
will it should be so, that although we were weaker than other colonies, they having
submitted to our king to protect them, others dared not other- wise to molest them; so
they expressed that they took that to be well, that we had little cause to doubt but that to
us under the king they would have yielded to our determinations in whatever any should
have complained to us against them; but Philip charged it to be dishonesty in us to put off
the hearing of their complaints; and therefore we consented to hear them. They said they
had been the first in doing good to the English, and the English the first in doing wrong;
they said when the English first came, their king’s father was as a great man and the
English as a little child. He constrained other Indians from wronging the English and
gave them corn and showed them how to plant and was free to do them any good and had
let them have a 100 times more land than now the king had for his own people. But their
king’s brother, when he was king, came miserably to die by being forced into court and,
as they judged, poisoned. And another grievance was if 20 of their honest Indians
testified that a Englishman had done them wrong, it was as nothing; and if but one of
their worst Indians testified against any Indian or their king when it pleased the English,
that was sufficient. Another grievance was when their kings sold land the English would
say it was more than they agreed to and a writing must be proof against all of them, and
some of their kings had done wrong to sell so much that he left his people none, and
some being given to drunkenness, the English made them drunk and then cheated them in
bargains, but now their kings were forewarned not to part with land for nothing in
comparison to the value thereof. Now whomever the English had once owned for king or
Metacom did not take this agreement seriously, for it, in effect, ended the autonomy of his tribe in return for very
little.
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queen, they would later disinherit, and make another king that would give or sell them
their land, that now they had no hopes left to keep any land. Another grievance was that
the English cattle and horses still increased so that when they removed 30 miles from
where the English had anything to do, they could not keep their corn from being spoiled,
they never being used to fence, and thought that when the English bought land of them
that they would have kept their cattle upon their own land. Another grievance was that
the English were so eager to sell the Indians liquors that most of the Indians spent all in
drunkenness and then ravened upon the sober Indians and, they did believe, often did hurt
the English cattle, and their kings could not prevent it. We knew beforehand that these
were their grand complaints, but then we only endeavored to persuade them that all
complaints might be righted without war but could get no other answer but that they had
not heard of that way for the governor of New York and an Indian king to have the
hearing of it.”75
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John Easton, “A Relation of the Indian War,” pp. 3 – 6.
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Interview Questions for research into King Philip’s War

The questions will, of course, vary depending on the interviewee and his/her knowledge base i.e.
is it from an historical perspective, archaeological perspective, or oral tradition. I anticipate
visiting the Mashantucket Pequot Museum, the Turner Fall Battle Site, The Robbins Museum of
Archaeology, and the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Museum. In addition, I anticipate discussing
the Native American perspective with members of the Wampanoag, Mashantucket Pequot, and
Narragansett tribal groups.
Some questions:

1. Can you provide me with a brief description of your background as it pertains to the
study of King Philip’s War?

2. History often tries to identify specific actions that lead to a larger historical event such as
war. Some narratives place the start of King Philip’s War as June 20, 1675 when a band
of Pokanoket warriors attacked Swansea. Others suggest the trial and execution of three
Wampanoag warriors, all said to be associates of Phillip, at Plymouth on June 8, 1675 for
the murder of John Sassamon, was the catalyst. Do you believe it was either of these
events or was the path to war already underway? Is there a single event or is it a sum of
several/many events?

3. The Nipmuck, Pocumtuck, and Narragansett Tribes allied under the leadership of Phillip.
The Mohegan and Mohawk allied with the colonists. Prior to the war the colonial and
Native American polities were interwoven by trade. Thinking about this, do you see the
war, at least in part, as a civil war?
4. Recent scholarship and research by historians such as James Axtell, Lisa Brooks, and
Christine DeLuca, are starting to bring a more ethnologically-based history to the study
of King Philip’s War. Is this a better way forward, combining the various sides into a
more singular work? Or should we keep the Native American and colonial narratives
separate? If so, why?
5. Primary sources, such as William Hubbard’s book, A Narrative of the Troubles with the
Indians in New-England, published in 1677, and Narrative of the Captivity and
Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson, published in 1682, give two often cited sources
for historical context about the war. What problems do you see in trying to reconstruct
events from what are perhaps biased sources?
Or
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6. Looking at the archaeological record of the war, do you see evidence to support the
history as it has been written, or do you see discrepancies between what the material
record seems to tell us and what the written narrative has to say?

7. What artifacts, if any, do you find in more than one location? What do these artifacts tell
us?
8. Native Americans had been trading with the Europeans since their first arrival in the late
16th century. One of the things they often traded for were guns. In 1671, King Phillip was
forced by the colonial government to sign a peace treaty and surrender the arms his
people had, which, according to the records, Phillip did. What does the archaeological
record have to say about Native American armaments? Were they using guns? Bow and
arrow? Perhaps a combination of the two? Does the archaeology suggest an one way or
another as to whether the 1671 treaty hurt the Native Americans technologically?
9. In your opinion, what are the major take-aways from the conflict? Were Native
American/Colonial relations harmed irreparably?
10. (Questions I hope to ask specifically to Tribal Historical persons), At what point do you
feel permanent damage was done to relations between the Europeans and their Native
American neighbors? Could conflict have been avoided? What would you like to see gain
more prominence in how the story, and subsequent stories, are told?
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Appendix II
Except where noted, all figures and data are from Kevin McBride, David Naumec, Ashley
Bissonnette, Noah Fellman, University of Connecticut, Technical Report 1676 Battle of Great
Falls / Wissantinnewag-Peskeompskut Site Identification and Evaluation Project Phase II
National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program GA-2287-18-007, Oct. 30, 2020
National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program 1849 C Street NW – Room 7228
Washington, DC 20240

Figure 1. Battle of the English Retreat

Figure 2. Musket ball and horse tack frequency
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Figure 3.

Fig. 4. Upper and Lower Factory Hollow – the areas circled in red indicate the
areas where musket balls and horse tack appear together.
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Fig. 5 Representation of multi-shot in the barrel

Fig. 6 17th century weapons and armor from Plimouth Patuxet collection
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locus

Inventory#

Period

Variety

Fragment

Treatment

Facet?

F

404

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

405

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

406

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

407

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

408

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

409

17th
century

musket
ball

.31"
diameter

dropped

No

F

432

17th
century

musket
ball

.31"
diameter

impacted

No

F

452

.53"
diameter
.52"
diameter

No

453

musket
ball
musket
ball

impacted

F

17th
century
17th
century

impacted

No

F

455

17th
century

musket
ball

.45"
diameter

impacted

No

F

456

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

465

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

467

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

468

17th
century

musket
ball

.45"
diameter

impacted

No

F

470

17th
century

musket
ball

.35"
diameter

impacted

Yes

F

471

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

479

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

F

481

17th
century

musket
ball

.53"
diameter

impacted

No

Comments
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61970000-72.55346167
round sprue, misshapen, gouges
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61957833-72.55342833
round sprue, misshapen, gouges
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61969000-72.55341500
round sprue, ricochet, red mineral sub
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61967833-72.55333333
round sprue, misshapen
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61971500-72.55335500
round sprue, misshapen, gouges
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61977167-72.55342833
no sprue, impacted
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61973333-72.55357000
sprue, gouges, striations
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.62034823-72.55294500
round sprue, deep cut, ricochet
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.62032167-72.55298667
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.62036000-72.55328333
With sprue
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.62025000-72.55286333
With sprue
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.62030667-72.55278333
misshapen, gouges, striations
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61936000-72.55357833
Has sprue, ricochet, embedded quartz
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61926667-72.55345500
sprue, misaligned casting seam, firing
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61922000-72.55354667
With sprue and faceted
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.62013000-72.55304333
sprue, misshapen, gouges
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.62039496-72.55256178
sprue, misshapen, gouges, ricochet
Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61923833-72.55352333
misshapen, ricochet
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F

483

17th
century

musket
ball

.33"
diameter

impacted

No

Factory Hollow Road 24
42.61931500-72.55355500
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